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Abstract
Digital forensics procedures should be developed to obtain digital evidence with regard to legal requirements
such as admissibility, authenticity, completeness, reliability and believability. On the other hand, Trojan banking
malware incident has grown significantly and creates a great threat to online banking users globally. This type
of malware is known to use anti-forensic technique to avoid forensic detection. Moreover, there are numerous
works and researches that impose the drawbacks on post-mortem forensics approach in dealing with evidence
that only resided on non-persistence memory or non-volatile memory. There are works that reveal the
disadvantage of live-response approach on incident response that might compromise the evidence as well. For
the last four years, there is notably developed on memory forensics approach that focusing on malware
incidents. This paper demonstrates the procedures that use three different forensics approaches on three
different Trojan banking malware samples: Cridex, ZeuS and SpyEye. The aim of this work is to obtain the
proper forensics approach on Trojan banking malware incidents. The paper also uses a network forensics
approach to gather and analyse the network-based evidence.
Keywords
Digital Evidence, Host-Based Evidence, Network Based Evidence, Post-Mortem Forensics, Memory Forensics,
Windows Registry Forensics, Trojan banking Malwares

INTRODUCTION
Rowlingson (2004) shows digital evidence is required whenever it can be used to support a legal process. Every
digital forensic examiner should consider the legal requirements of digital evidence that consists of admissibility,
authenticity, completeness, reliability, and believable (Group, 2002). The examiner is looking at an object that
has been designed by people to obtain the digital evidence that might fulfill those requirements when analysing
digital data. Furthermore, the storage systems of most digital devices have been designed to be scalable and
flexible, and that have a layered design. Carrier (2005) shows the different analysis area with figure below:

Figure 1: Layers of analysis based on the design of digital data (Carrier, 2005)
This different analysis area creates a multiplicity of subject matter such as computer forensics, database
forensics, memory forensics, Windows registry forensics and network forensics. Computer forensics or known
as post-mortem forensics involve shutting a computer down to inspect the disks. However, this process breaks
network connections and unmounts encrypted disks, resulting in a loss of information and disabling critical
processes. Live forensic tools can partially overcome these problems by inspecting active systems (Chan,
Chaugule, Larson, & Campbell, 2010). Garcia (2007) reveals that traditional forensic approach, which is,
relying in either virtual memory scanning or persistent data, is not sufficient. Subversion techniques such as
shadow walker clearly illustrate the need for memory scanners tools aware of malware hiding techniques.
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Waits, Akinyele, Nolan, and Rogers (2008) documented three significant setbacks on live response. First, it may
rely on Windows API tools. Therefore if the examiner collects the evidence based on compromised sources
without they are suspecting it, then this condition could damage the credibility of the evidence in a court of law.
Second, the live response is not repeatable and third, the examiners cannot ask new questions later. On the other
hand, there is a significantly growing on memory forensics for the last four years. The progress of this field is
forced by the need from digital forensic community in dealing with the outgrowth of malicious software such as
Trojan banking malwares.
McAfee and Guardian Analytics performed a study on Operation High Roller on 2012 and uncovered a highly
sophisticated, global financial services fraud. The study found 60 servers processing thousands of attempted
thefts from high-value commercial accounts and some high net worth individuals. Three distinct attack strategies
have emerged as the targets have expanded from the European Union, to Latin America, to the United States.
Debunking the popular wisdom that only big banks are affected, the research document attacks every class of
financial institution: credit union, large global bank, and regional bank. The study estimates the criminals have
attempted at least €60 million (US$78 million) in fraudulent transfers from accounts at 60 or more financial
institutions (FIs). If all of the attempted fraud campaigns were as successful the total attempted fraud could be as
high as €2 billion. Trojan banking malware such as ZeuS and SpyEye might expect to be held liable for those
losses (Marcus & Sherstobitoff, 2012).
Brand (2007) reveals that malware can integrate numerous techniques to avoid forensic detection and forensic
analysis as well. This technique is known as anti-forensic. Primary goals for anti-forensic is leaving no evidence,
avoiding detection, disrupting the collection of information and casting doubt on a forensic report (Garfinkel,
2007). These researches have the same message to digital forensic community: the challenge for collecting the
digital evidence in regards with legal consideration.
With the challenge from Trojan banking malwares and the shortcomings on post-mortem forensics and live
response, then the question is the proper approach that available for the examiners for collecting the digital
evidence on Trojan banking malware incidents. This paper demonstrates how the live response, memory forensic
and Windows registry forensics as a representation of post-mortem forensics find the digital evidence on Trojan
banking malware incidents. The results will show whether the live response and Windows registry analysis are
still the viable options for the examiner on Trojan banking malware incidents. This work also demonstrates
network forensics as a conjunction process to obtain more robust and thorough evidence.
This paper uses three different Trojan banking malware samples: Cridex, ZeuS and SpyEye as the object of
analysis. The reason for analysing different samples is to acquire the pattern of the malwares and the reason for
choosing the malware sample is based on the popularity and the financial impacts on a global scale. This work is
far from exhaustive, and serves merely as an introduction to the techniques employed to live response, memory
forensics, Windows registry analysis, network forensics and malware analysis of Trojan banking malwares.
This work uses active approach by executing the malware samples on controlled environment. For this paper,
legal issue surrounding the behavioural analysis of the malware samples is ignored. It is presumed the malicious
software that is being examined is the intellectual property of the organization that will has authorised this
activity. Cridex, Zeus and SpyEye as samples on this paper have many different variants. Therefore the results
from analysis on this paper works only for the variants that have been used. The different variants from the same
malware sample might show a different result.

RELATED WORKS
IOActive (2012) performed a reversal and analysis of the Trojans banking such as SpyEye and ZeuS . The study
reveals that SpyEye incorporated many advanced tricks try to hide its presence on the local system. The bot's
advanced hooking and injection mechanisms as well as its core functionality used to hijack and steal user
information. On the other hand, ZeuS has been identified has additional roadblocks including non-existent
import address tables, obfuscated string tables, and relocated code. ZeuS included many methods to hinder
reverse engineering.
According to Ståhlberg (2008), the Mstrings approach to Trojan banking analysis and detection seem feasible for
the moment. Most current Trojan banking can be detected solely because they include filter strings. Especially if
the analysis system has access to the internet, this approach can be used to analyse incoming malware samples.
An alert can be sent to targeted banks and this can be done automatically.
On his study of SilentBanker, Theerthagiri (2009) reveals that organizations should think about creating
signatures for preventing information leaks and also block all possible sites and IP addresses that host exploits or
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drop site of Trojans. Attackers can modify the present code of the Trojan banking and strive to keep their exploit
server active. In his study, Dolan-Gavitt (2008) found that it is possible for an attacker with the ability to modify
kernel memory to alter the cached registry data in memory, and thus alter the behavior of the operating system,
without the changes being visible in the on-disk storage. In the same paper, Dollan-Gavitt also noted that an
average of 631 keys and 1231 values per image were volatile and would not have been found using methods that
only examine the hives on disk.
Malware researchers show techniques to escape memory analysis using a low-level rootkit (Sparks & Butler,
2005) and that certain virtualization-based rootkits may be hard to detect (Chen & Samuel, 2006). On the other
hand, memory forensics researchers show how memory forensics tools such as Volatility could be used for
analyzing the Trojan banking malwares for finding the evidence (DiMino, 2012; Malwareninja, 2011).

CHARACTERISTICS OF TROJAN BANKING MALWARES
The detail information of malware samples that have been used on this paper is described on Appendices 1.
Additionally, there are six characters of Trojan banking malwares that have been applied as the targets for
achieving the objective of this work (OWASP, 2012). Every forensics approach should be worked to find the
evidence based on the characteristic. The procedures and tools for acquiring the digital evidence are documented
on Appendices 2.

No
1

2

3
4

5

6

Table 1: Characterization and targets of digital evidence
Digital Evidence to Find
Characterization
Installation by finding the Worms All the Trojan banking malwares are known to have copy of the
Copy on the Virtual Machine.
worms after it was running or execute on the victim’s machine.
Therefore, the first footprint that indicated the existence of such
malware is the worms copy on the victim’s machine.
Payload (Processes)
After creating the worms copy on the victim’s machine, the
malware will running its payload through certain services or
processes on the victim’s machine. There are several researches
or works that shows the possibility of such Trojan banking
malwares use the anti-forensic techniques to hide its existence or
function. The techniques ware used to avoid detection from antivirus and forensic application, especially on Live Response
approach.
Network Connections
One of the main purposes of the payload or processes is to create
a connection to the Command and Control (C&C) Server.
Mutant
or
Mutex
(mutual Malwares often uses mutex objects for the same purpose as
exclusion) Objects
legitimate software and to avoid re-infecting the host. Therefore,
mutex object is one of persistent signature on the victim’s
machine.
The important information on the Trojan banking malwares has documented its target such as
particular processes
particular financial organization, name and IP Addresses of the
C&C Server on the particular processes. This information could
be obtained by dumping the services and make output strings
from it.
Firewall Policy
To avoid its existence, the Trojan banking malwares change the
firewall policy on the Operating System.

RESULTS
Installation by finding the worms copy on the virtual machine
Live response approach finds the evidence for the installation on the three malware samples. The evidence shows
that Cridex has the worm copy with name of the file: kb00374800.exe. This worm execution file has found by
Autoruns and WinAudit. On Zeus with the name of worm copy: ntos.exe. This worm execution file has found
by Autoruns, Handle, Rootkit Revealer and WinAudit. On SpyEye with the name of worm copy:
cleansweep.exe. This worm execution file found by Rootkit Revealer. Memory forensics approach with
Volatility finds the existence of worm copy of Cridex on the virtual machine with command: printkey -K
"Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run". For Zeus, Volatility finds the existence of worms copy
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with command: -o 0xe17fea40 -K "Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon". Windows Registry
approach with Registry Viewer finds the evidence on Cridex and SpyEye on registry path:
NTUSER.DAT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run. For Zeus, Registry Viewer finds the
existence of worms copy on Software\Microsoft\WindowsNT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon. This results show
that all approaches could find the evidence of Installation process on the three malware samples.
Payload (Processes)
Live Response approach through Process Explorer records all the suspicious processes on the three malwares
samples. Memory Forensic approach also shows the records of all the suspicious processes or payloads on the
three malware samples. Windows Registry approach could not deliver the evidence of payloads on the three
malware samples.
Network connections
The result for live response approach is documented on the Network-based evidence. Memory forensic approach
with Volatility finds several findings: On ZeuS, there is one connection suspected with C&C Server with IP
Address 195.2.253.194. This connection was created by the payload (svchost.exe/PID 864). On SpyEye, there is
a connection that suspected with C&C Server with IP Address 188.40.138.148. This connection was created by
the payload (cleansweep.exe/PID1456). On the Cridex, there is no significant connection that could be identified
as a suspicious connection with C&C Server. But according with (DiMino, 2012), his work for analyzing the
Cridex shows that there is a connection with the indicated C&C Server. On the other hand, Windows Registry
approach could not find the evidence for the connections with C&C Server.
Mutant or mutex (mutual exclusion) objects
There is no mutex objects found by live response approach. Memory Forensic forensics finds 114 mutex objects
on Cridex, 125 mutex objects on Zeus and 96 mutex objects on SpyEye. After analyzing all the mutex objects
from the three malwares, there are similar 59 mutex object found on all the malwares. It is indicated that those
mutex object has been used for avoiding the multiple infections by the three malware samples on the same
machine.
The important information on the particular processes
Live response approach could not find the important and relevant strings on the dumping processes. Memory
forensics approach could found the important information by dumping the certain processes and create the output
strings from it. The suspicious payload (svchost.exe/PID 1164) on Cridex shows the name of DNS that indicated
work as a C&C Servers. The suspicious payload (svchost.exe/PID 864) on Zeus shows the IP Address of C&C
Servers. The suspicious payload (svchost.exe/PID 1084) on SpyEye shows the name of DNS that indicated work
as a C&C Servers. Windows Registry approach could not find the evidence in terms of important information on
the registry files.
Firewall policy
Live response approach through WinAudit reports that the Firewall is disabled on Zeus incident. Memory
Forensic approach also finds the same evidence that Firewall is disabled by Zeus. The command to find the
perimeter
of
the
Firewall
Policy
on
the
memory:
-K
"ControlSet001\Services\SharedAccess\Parameters\FirewallPolicy\StandardProfile". Based on the Regshot
results, Cridex changes the Firewall Policy on the Registry by opening Port 1900, 2869, 139, 445, 137 and 138.
After examining with Registry Viewer on one of File Registry: SYSTEM, then the finding supports the Regshot
result. For Zeus, Registry Viewer finds the Firewall Policy on: SYSTEM \CurrentControlSet
\Services\SharedAccess\Parameters\FirewallPolicy\StandardProfile with value:”0” (disable).

NETWORK-BASED EVIDENCE
Trojan malwares are highly dependent of the network for propagation, control and payload functionality.
Therefore, network forensics is play important role on finding the network-based evidence beside the host-based
forensics approach such as post-mortem, live response, and memory analysis. As part of triangulation on
obtaining and analyzing the digital evidence, this works documented the network forensics approach on the three
malware samples.
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Netstat Command
This paper uses comparison of Protocol Connections and TCP/IP network connections on condition before and
after running the malware with Netstat command (netstat –ano). TCPView and Port Explorer use in conjunction
with the Netstat’s comparison to acquire thorough analysis. This comparison and records/log from TCPView
and Port Explorer give the summary of the results below:

Malware
Cridex

ZeuS

SpyEye

Table 2: Result of Netstat command, TCPView and Port Explorer
New Active Connections After Running the Malware
TCPView and Port
Explorer
Proto Local Address Foreign Address State
PID
- There is no record or log
on TCPView regarding
with the PID 1164 and its
UDP
0.0.0.0:64625
*:*
1164
relation with TCP/UDP
Connections.
- The Port Explorer shown
the same result with
TCPView.
Proto Local Address Foreign Address State
PID
- There is complete record
or log on TCPView
regarding with the PID
TCP 0.0.0.0:12642 0.0.0.0:0
LISTENING
864
864
with
3
TCP
TCP 0.0.0.0:26994 0.0.0.0:0
LISTENING
864
Connections and its port
TCP 0.0.0.0:38606 0.0.0.0:0
LISTENING
864
number.
- The Port Explorer shown
the same result with
TCPView.
Proto Local Address Foreign Address State
PID
- There is no record or log
on TCPView regarding
with the PID 1084 and its
UDP 0.0.0.0:55144
*:*
1084
relation with TCP/UDP
Connections.
- The Port Explorer shown
the same result with
TCPView.

The new active or changing of TCP/IP connection(s) leads to other analysis. The process explorer gives specific
information regarding with the specific process/PID. This analysis process is important for finding the
payload(s), since Trojan banking malware has known to use API hooking technique to execute its payload. The
summary of Process Explorer shown below:
No
Cridex

Process PID
winlogon.exe
svchost.exe

ZeuS

SpyEye

624
1164

winlogon.exe

628

svchost.exe

864

winlogon.exe

628

svchost.exe

1084

Table 3: Result of Process Explorer
CPU Private Bytes
Working
Set
Description
Company Name
6,564 K 356 K Windows
NT
Logon
Application
Microsoft Corporation
1,436 K 88 K
Generic Host Process for
Win32 Services Microsoft Corporation
6,804 K 696 K
Application
6,832 K 2,116 K
Win32 Services
7,188 K 5,296 K
Application
1,640 K 4,104 K
Win32 Services

Windows
NT
Logon
Microsoft Corporation
Generic Host Process for
Microsoft Corporation
Windows
NT
Logon
Microsoft Corporation
Generic Host Process for
Microsoft Corporation

Description
Parent Process ID

Parent Process ID

Parent Process ID

It reveals that all the malwares install themselves into Winlogon.exe. The purpose is to make sure the payload
will be started every time when the Windows OS boots up and from here it will spread to every single process.
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Dump the Process and Strings Output
The results from previous analysis could be used as the base of dumping the particular process. Then the analyst
could perform an analysis of the Strings Output from it. From the strings output, the analyst might find important
and interesting strings which could be used as the evidence. The example of strings output from memory dump
of particular process is shown on Appendices 3.
These strings output shows that each malware samples using a different method for stealing the credentials. The
strings output from ZeuS reveals the specified IP Address. This information is important for finding the C&C
server or who might be responsible for the actions of malware.
Network Packet Capture
Wireshark has been used for examining network traffic for evidence of unusual or malicious traffic on the virtual
machine. Using Wireshark to capture traffic to and from a suspect host is an example of reactive analysis
(Chappell, 2010).
The network traffics on Cridex and SpyEye show the DNS Protocol packets. This indicates that the payload of
Cridex and SpyEye communicates via SSL with a remote server for command and control of the malware. The
Cridex was observed to connect with 4 of the following domains for this purpose such as evenconc.ru, extorld.ru,
imbingdo.ru and shushev.ru. Almost all the packets or frames were contained with only two protocols: Domain
Name Service (DNS) and NetBIOS Name Service. SpyEye was observed creating a connection with
horizontalspy.domain.lc with IP Address 188.40.138.148. It is indicating that the domain server works as a C&C
Server. Following the TCP Stream for the packets based on the IP Address shows two interesting results:
POST http://horizonspy.domain.lc/formgrabber/websitechk.php HTTP/1.1
Host: horizonspy.domain.lc
Connection: close
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=55377776816118
Content-Length: 667
(skipped)
GET
/main/bt_version_checker.php?guid=COMPUTER!VM_TROJAN!18C21DD0&ver=10070&stat=ONLINE&ie=
8.0.6001.18702&os=5.1.2600&ut=Admin&cpu=12&ccrc=0181AD0B HTTP/1.1
User-Agent: Microsoft Internet Explorer
Host: horizonspy.domain.lc
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Date: Fri, 19 Oct 2012 07:18:15 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.9
Location:
http://horizonspy.domain.lc/?guid=COMPUTER!VM_TROJAN!18C21DD0&ver=10070&stat=ONLINE&ie=8.
0.6001.18702&os=5.1.2600&ut=Admin&cpu=12&ccrc=0181AD0B
(skipped)

The stream content above is supporting the finding from the strings output from svchost.exe (PID 1084). It is
found that the payload create a connection with the C&C Server and perform certain method GET and POST in
HTML forms command into the specified URL in order to steal the credential’s online banking users.
The packet captures from ZeuS shows interesting results. There is a connection and network packets transferred
between virtual machine and IP Address 195.2.253.194 that hosted by spheral.ru. The condition is aligning with
the strings output from svchost.exe (PID 864). The strings output documented two specified IP Address:
195.2.253.194 and 64.59.140.93. These IP Addresses were indicated work as the C&C server. Analysis results
from Wireshark shows the statistical condition for TCP Endpoints from these connections. There are 17 ports
were open to transfer and receive the packets. One port is rootd or port 1094. The rootd daemon works with
the TNetFile class. It allows remote access to root database files in either read or read/write mode.

15

DISCUSSION
The procedures on live-response, memory forensics and Windows Registry approaches for acquiring the digital
evidence on the three different Trojan banking malware incidents shows the significant results. Live-response
and Windows Registry approaches could find the digital evidence, however there is the possibility of antiforensics techniques on the malware samples that might compromise the results. All the approaches could
identify and obtain the evidence of installation or worm copy on the infected machines. The same result also
founds to identify the Firewall Policy that might have been changed by the malwares on the infected machines.
On the other hand, memory forensics approach shows the advancement of its technique to find all the target
evidence.
Group (2002) reveals every examiner should obtained from the volatile to the less volatile when collecting
evidence on incident response. This statement aligned with this work. Almost all the evidence on Trojan
banking malware incidents were resided on the physical memory. Therefore, the examiner should avoid
performing post-mortem forensics approach on such incidents before they collect and/or analyze the volatile
memory.
Walters and Petroni (2007) documented a set of drawbacks on live-response approach when it wants to be used
on the incident response. One drawback is live-response might disturbs the state of machine under investigation.
This condition is inevitable, since the examiner should run a several Windows API applications to obtain the
evidence on the infected machines. Even though the examiner could find the valid and relevant evidence by this
technique, but considering the possibility of the disturbance on the victim’s machine then it is obvious to use
proper forensics approach on Trojan banking malware incidents. If the examiner still insists to perform live
response approach, and then it has been advised to perform it after dumping the physical memory.
Network forensics approach shows how to identify the presence of the malware on the network and obtain
network-based evidence as a conjunction with host-based evidence. The netstat command as the initial analysis
shows the indicated malicious processes or known as payloads. On the other hand, other tools could not detect
such processes. On the next process, the examiner could dump the processes and make strings output from it.
Moreover, this work shows the importance of the strings. It might contain all relevant and valid information due
to the payload functionality and C&C server connections from each malware samples. These finding supports
the research by Stahlberg (2007) that most of current Trojan banking could be detected solely based on the filter
strings.

CONCLUSION
This paper has demonstrated and discussed the procedures and findings on live-response, memory forensics and
Windows Registry forensics approaches. The results might show the proper forensics approach on Trojan
banking malware incident for digital forensic examiner with regard to legal requirement on digital evidence.
Despite of the approaches, every examiner should prioritize the collection of volatile memory on Trojan banking
malware incidents. Memory forensics approach shows the thorough and robust findings with minimal
disturbance on the machine. The examiner only needs to dump the physical memory on the first occasion of
incidents without running many applications such as Windows API tools on live-response. This approach also
offering repeatability and reproducibility factors that might fulfill legal requirement on digital evidence.
This paper also shows the importance of network forensics on Trojan banking malware incidents. Since the
Trojan malwares are highly dependent on the network for propagation, control and payload functionality, then
examiner might consider collecting the network-based evidence beside the host-based evidence. Both
procedures could be performed as a conjunction to acquire more robust and thorough digital evidence.
Moreover, the organization could use the network-based evidence such as the strings, suspicious IP Address, and
malicious packets to prevent such incidents on the future by adding this information on Intrusion Prevention
System/Intrusion Detection System.
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APPENDICES
Appendices 1: Detail information and source of malware samples

No
1

2

3

Table 4: Detail information and source of malware samples
Malware Sample
Source
http://oc.gtisc.gatech.edu:8080/search.cgi?s
Cridex Trojan Banking
earch=cridex
MD5: e92de5cc06a361575d24adbde4bf0e81
SHA1: 29fc820e7e989f961cf7eab24a4f553488a60307
http://oc.gtisc.gatech.edu:8080/search.cgi?s
ZeuS Trojan Banking
earch=zeus
MD5: fb4d991644686160625eafe0c589392b
SHA1:
944810e76932d83e338d25711175fc66903c8c0a
http://oc.gtisc.gatech.edu:8080/search.cgi?s
SpyEye Trojan Banking
earch=spyeye
MD5: 79ac48be8de57d54764fdd22c0fe3f16
SHA1: 38f0f5d3849e78a1e0fb6f83e9fedf8f45d1cffb
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Appendices 2: Tools and Procedures

2

Table 5: Tools and procedures on live response approach
Tools
Procedures
Running several applications:
Autoruns
1. Autoruns Options:
a. Process Explorer v15.23,
- Hide Microsoft and Windows Entries;
- Verify code signatures.
b. Autoruns for Windows v11.34,
2. Save the output scan for comparison process.
c. Handle v3.5
Process Explorer:
1. Paused by pressing the space bar
Handle:
Run and save the result
Running the Malware

3

a. Handle v.3.5

1) Run Handle and save the result.

b. Autoruns;

2) Refresh Autoruns and Process Explorer.

o
1

c. Process Explorer.
4

a. Autoruns;

1) Run compare function on Autoruns and save the result;

b. Process Explorer’s

2) Check the suspicious program on Autoruns for its processes
on Process Explorer;
3) Save the Process Explorer’s capturing process;
4) Check for any suspicious highlighted process on Process
Explorer and records/save the results.
5) Check the digital signature with Process Explorer for any
suspicious processes and records/save the results;
6) Dump the suspicious processes and save the strings with
Process Explorer.

5

-

VMMap

1) Run the VMMap against the suspicious processes
2) Use VMMap’s strings dialog for any suspicious processes.
3) Save the results;

6

WinAudit Freeware v.2.29

7

RootkitRevealer v1.71

8

Analysis

No
1
2

No
1
2
3

No

Run WinAudit and save the result.
Scan for any presence of the rootkit on virtual machine.
Analyse all the results from the tools above.

Table 6: Tools and procedures on memory forensics approach
Tools
Procedures
VMware Player with Windows XP Suspend the virtual machine and copy the vmem for analysis
SP3x86 as the Operating System
process.
Volatility ver. 2.2
Analyse with Volatility ver. 2.2
Table 7: Tools and procedures on windows registry forensics approach
Tools
Procedures
VMware Player with Windows XP Shutdown and booting the virtual machine
SP3x86 as the Operating System
FTK Imager
Acquire the Windows Registry with FTK Imager
Registry Viewer
Analyse the Windows Registry with Registry Viewer
Table 8: Tools and procedures on network forensics approach
Tools
Procedures
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1

Running several applications:
a)

Regshot v.1.8.3;

b)

TCPView v.2.54

c)

Port Explorer

d)

Wireshark both on Guest and
Host

e)

Netstat on Operating System;

2
3

Regshot:
Capture 1st conditions
Netstat-ano:
Run Netstat –ano from command prompt and Save on notepad.
Wireshark:
Capture the packet

Running the Malware
f)

Wireshark

a)

g)

Netstat

h)

Regshot:

b) Run Netstat –ano from command prompt and save on
notepad.
c.

4

Analysis

Wireshark: capture the packet;

Reghsot: capture 2nd condition and run compare function
and save the result;

Analyse all the results from the tools above.

Appendices 3: Example of Strings Output Results
TABLE 9: EXAMPLE OF STRINGS OUTPUT RESULTS

Malwares
Cridex

ZeuS

Example Strings Output
svchost.exe.2486c10.0x00630000-0x0066ffff.dmp: shushev.ru
svchost.exe.2486c10.0x00630000-0x0066ffff.dmp: shushev.ru.localdomain
svchost.exe.2486c10.0x76770000-0x7677cfff.dmp: Logging information for DNS Caching
Resolver service
svchost.exe.2486c10.0x76770000-0x7677cfff.dmp: System Time Information
svchost.exe.2486c10.0x76770000-0x7677cfff.dmp: DNS Caching Resolver service
svchost.exe.2486c10.0x76770000-0x7677cfff.dmp: d:\nt\ds\dns\resolver\server\remote.c
svchost.exe.2486c10.0x76770000-0x7677cfff.dmp: d:\nt\ds\dns\resolver\server\rpc.c
svchost.exe.2486c10.0x76f20000-0x76f46fff.dmp: www.microsoft.com
svchost.exe.2486c10.0x76f20000-0x76f46fff.dmp: microsoft.com
svchost.exe.2486c10.0x76f20000-0x76f46fff.dmp: update.microsoft.com
svchost.exe.2486c10.0x76f20000-0x76f46fff.dmp: download.microsoft.com
svchost.exe.2486c10.0x76f20000-0x76f46fff.dmp: microsoftupdate.com
svchost.exe.2486c10.0x76f20000-0x76f46fff.dmp: windowsupdate.com
svchost.exe.23d7da0.0x00090000-0x0018ffff.dmp:
Ahttps://onlineeast#.bankofamerica.com/cgi-bin/ias/*/GotoWelcome
svchost.exe.23d7da0.0x00090000-0x0018ffff.dmp: Password: %s
svchost.exe.23d7da0.0x00090000-0x0018ffff.dmp: Type: %s
svchost.exe.23d7da0.0x00090000-0x0018ffff.dmp: Version: %S
svchost.exe.23d7da0.0x00090000-0x0018ffff.dmp: Balance:
svchost.exe.23d7da0.0x00090000-0x0018ffff.dmp:
C:\WINDOWS\system32\config\systemprofile\Local Settings\Temporary Internet
Files\Content.IE5\
svchost.exe.23d7da0.0x00090000-0x0018ffff.dmp: Ahttps://www.egold.com/sci_asp/payments.asp
svchost.exe.23d7da0.0x00090000-0x0018ffff.dmp: A*PAYMENT_AMOUNT=
svchost.exe.23d7da0.0x00090000-0x0018ffff.dmp: APAYEE_ACCOUNT=*&
svchost.exe.23d7da0.0x00090000-0x0018ffff.dmp: APAYEE_ACCOUNT=%u&
svchost.exe.23d7da0.0x00090000-0x0018ffff.dmp: Application/x-internet-signup
svchost.exe.23d7da0.0x00090000-0x0018ffff.dmp: ://195.2.253.194/lsd/tt.bin
svchost.exe.23d7da0.0x00090000-0x0018ffff.dmp: /lsd/tt.bin HTTP/1.1
svchost.exe.23d7da0.0x00090000-0x0018ffff.dmp: ://195.2.253.194/lsd/tt.bin
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svchost.exe.23d7da0.0x00090000-0x0018ffff.dmp: http://64.59.140.93/wpad.dat
svchost.exe.2225ca8.0x00090000-0x0018ffff.dmp: ost.exe
svchost.exe.2225ca8.0x0ea50000-0x0ea78fff.dmp: _AVIRA_
svchost.exe.2225ca8.0x0ea50000-0x0ea78fff.dmp: __SYSTEM__
svchost.exe.2225ca8.0x0ea50000-0x0ea78fff.dmp: *call*event*
svchost.exe.2225ca8.0x0ea50000-0x0ea78fff.dmp: call_event
svchost.exe.2225ca8.0x0ea50000-0x0ea78fff.dmp: onclick
svchost.exe.2225ca8.0x0ea50000-0x0ea78fff.dmp: target
svchost.exe.2225ca8.0x0ea50000-0x0ea78fff.dmp: American Express
svchost.exe.2225ca8.0x0ea50000-0x0ea78fff.dmp: Visa
svchost.exe.2225ca8.0x0ea50000-0x0ea78fff.dmp: MasterCard
svchost.exe.2225ca8.0x0ea50000-0x0ea78fff.dmp: Discover
svchost.exe.2225ca8.0x0ea50000-0x0ea78fff.dmp: Smth wrong with navigate to BILLINGPAGE. 0_o
svchost.exe.2225ca8.0x0ea50000-0x0ea78fff.dmp: *We are sending*
svchost.exe.2225ca8.0x0ea50000-0x0ea78fff.dmp: *Thank You For Your Order*
svchost.exe.2225ca8.0x0ea50000-0x0ea78fff.dmp: core-section-header
svchost.exe.2225ca8.0x0ea50000-0x0ea78fff.dmp: confirm:card_exp_year
svchost.exe.2225ca8.0x0ea50000-0x0ea78fff.dmp: Cannot find Month stuff on second page.
0_o
svchost.exe.2225ca8.0x0ea50000-0x0ea78fff.dmp: confirm:card_exp_month
svchost.exe.2225ca8.0x0ea50000-0x0ea78fff.dmp: Cannot find CSC stuff on second page.
0_o
svchost.exe.2225ca8.0x0ea50000-0x0ea78fff.dmp: confirm:card_security_code
svchost.exe.2225ca8.0x0ea50000-0x0ea78fff.dmp: Cannot find CardNumber stuff on second
page. 0_o
svchost.exe.2225ca8.0x0ea50000-0x0ea78fff.dmp: confirm:card_number
svchost.exe.2225ca8.0x0ea50000-0x0ea78fff.dmp: http://www.microsoft.com
svchost.exe.2225ca8.0x0ea50000-0x0ea78fff.dmp: horizonspy.domain.lc
svchost.exe.2225ca8.0x0ea50000-0x0ea78fff.dmp:
http://horizonspy.domain.lc/formgrabber/websitechk.php
svchost.exe.2225ca8.0x0ea50000-0x0ea78fff.dmp:
http://horizonspy.domain.lc/formgrabber/websitecheck.php
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